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D
espite its recent prevalence in the Western news
media, waterboarding, or “the submarine” (as it is
known in some Latin American countries), is any-
thing but novel in the realm of torture.
Waterboarding entails many different methods of torture, each
using water to suffocate detainees and provoke the sensation of
drowning. The effect results within a few seconds or minutes and
leaves no external injuries, thereby eluding a definition of torture
which requires proof of injury, bleeding, or other physical harm.
Waterboarding has been designed to cause intense psychological
pain while granting technical impunity to those administering the
punishment.
The profoundly debilitating and long-lasting effects of water-
boarding were recently exposed in Chile through victim testimony
to the Commission to Investigate and Report on Cases of Torture
and Political Imprisonment during the Augusto Pinochet dictator-
ship from 1973-1990. The Commission’s ensuing report con-
tained testimony of waterboarding victims who attested that more
than 30 years after being tortured, they continued to suffer the
devastating effects of psychological torture.
Notwithstanding the Chilean experience, the Bush adminis-
tration argues that waterboarding does not cause long-term effects
or serious injury or harm, and should not be considered “torture.”
The administration’s efforts to legitimize the use of torture, issue
exceptions to its absolute prohibition, and limit its definition
demonstrate that torture is still considered an important tool in
the U.S.-led “War on Terror.” They also demonstrate that legiti-
mate, long-standing democracies are not immune from violating
human rights, despite being signatories to international conven-
tions prohibiting such behavior and having long-standing reputa-
tions as human rights protectors.
While such conclusions cast doubt on the true advances
humankind has made toward securing international human rights
protections, the Chilean government’s recent step toward recogni-
tion and reparation for state-sponsored torture is a hopeful exam-
ple of how a country bearing a history of gross violations of human
rights may acknowledge the past while instituting protections to
prevent future violations. Chile also serves as both an example and
a warning to countries like the United States that continue to jus-
tify the use of the same types of torture that caused long-lasting
psychological pain to thousands of Chileans. The legacy of Chile’s
dictatorship exposed the indisputably debilitating effects of water-
boarding and other types of torture, and it leaves little room for the
Bush administration to justify the use of these techniques.
Waterboarding in Chile
On September 11, 1973, a Military Junta led by Augusto
Pinochet overthrew President Salvador Allende’s democratically-
elected government in Chile. Pinochet’s dictatorship lasted 17
years and made extensive use of torture, especially following its ini-
tial rise to power. Immediately after the coup, massive repression
led to hundreds of deaths and the detention of thousands of peo-
ple. More people were detained in the first two-and-a-half months
of the dictatorship than in the remaining 17 years of Pinochet’s
rule.1 Indeed, ten percent of all those detained over the 17 years of
the dictatorship were detained in the first two days following the
coup. Victims ranging from ministers and members of Congress to
civic leaders in small towns were arrested in every community in
the country. The techniques employed were initially unsophisti-
cated, and the torturers did not seem concerned about leaving vis-
ible scars or signs.  
As the military regime later tried to legitimize control of the
country and create institutions that resembled a democracy, other
techniques began to be used. Laws were passed to criminalize sub-
versive behavior like “terrorism,” which was broadly defined, to use
military courts to judge those cases, and to limit the use of habeas
corpus. The regime also tried to avoid its responsibility for human
rights violations by passing an amnesty law that covered the worst
years of repression.
The Findings of the Valech Commission
In November 2003, President Ricardo Lagos established the
National Commission of Political Imprisonment and Torture of
Chile, known as the Valech Commission.2 According to the
records presented, the Commission was created to identify those
who, for political reasons, suffered imprisonment and torture at
the hands of state agents or people in its service between
September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1990. After interviewing more
than 35,000 people during a period of six months, the
Commission found evidence that 28,459 were victims of political
imprisonment and torture.3
Waterboarding was included among the torture methods
recorded. The report describes methods such as the asphyxiation of
the detainees, aimed at causing physical and psychological suffer-
ing by confronting them with the possibility of death.
Asphyxiation was usually caused by submerging the detainee’s head
into water several times, producing a near-death experience. In
some cases, detainees were hung from their legs with ropes and
submerged in water tanks. Usually the water used was contami-
nated or filled with debris. Other alternatives included putting the
detainee’s head inside a plastic bag, causing asphyxiation, or forc-
ing with high pressure great amounts of water through hoses into
the detainee’s mouth or nose.4
The report describes the testimony of a man, tortured in
September 1973, at a Navy compound: “[T]hey put cotton on
both eyes, then taped them and tightened a hood around my neck.
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They tied my hands and legs and submerged me in a 250-liter tank
that had ammonia, urine, excrement, and sea water. They sub-
merged me until I could not breathe anymore. They repeated it
over and over, while beating me and asking me questions. That is
what they called the submarine.”5
The effects of torture by “submarine” were very similar to the
effects experienced by those who suffered other types of torture
described to the Valech Commission. Besides physical pain, torture
also provoked a near-death experience that made victims feel help-
less. Most victims reported feeling deep humiliation and that their
lives were entirely at the mercy of their torturers. According to the
report, this is precisely why torture is used: to destroy prisoners’
will, dignity, and moral, psychological, and physical resolve, so that
they reveal the desired information. The Commission report
describes the deep psychological trauma suffered by torture victims
not only at the time of their torture, but, significantly, thirty years
later. Most victims reported having some or all of the symptoms of
post traumatic stress disorder, including feelings of insecurity or
fear, humiliation, worthlessness, shame, guilt, depression, anxiety,
and hopelessness. 
A man tortured at age 22 said, “Even today I wake up because
of having nightmares of dying from drowning.”6 A woman
declared, “I suffer long periods of insomnia and recurrent night-
mares: the noise of opening and closing fences, the noise of chains
and steps that stop in front of my door. I see endless lines of bleed-
ing people passing in front of me. I wake up covered with sweat.
Why haven’t I been able to forget, and to stop torturing myself in
my dreams after so many years?”7
These consequences were well documented by the victims’
relatives. They emphasized how their parents or spouses changed
after being released from prison and how they became irritable,
introverted, or depressed. For many people life changed dramati-
cally, in some cases leading to divorce or alcoholism, or seriously
affecting their ability to establish permanent interpersonal rela-
tionships or trust other people. Many never talked about their
experience even to their spouses or closest relatives, staying isolated
by their silence, revealing the profound dimension of their trau-
matic experiences.
The numerous and long-lasting effects of torture identified
by the Commission reinforce the necessity for the absolute prohi-
bition of torture and the inclusion of mental pain and suffering in
the definition given by the UN Convention Against Torture
(CAT). Methods like waterboarding, which causes the real sensa-
tion of death at the hands of interrogators, have profound psycho-
logical consequences that can be as severe and debilitating as any
wounds left by physical torture. Attempts to limit the definition of
torture solely to the infliction of certain amounts of physical pain,
without considering psychological suffering, deep humiliation, or
near-death experience, is not consistent with the spirit of the
CAT’s definition nor the conclusions of the Valech Commission.
Yet the Pinochet regime did not limit the use of torture to
interrogations designed to force confessions. The indiscriminate
use of torture during many questioning sessions suggests that its
real purpose was to destroy people’s will to oppose the regime and
give up their commitment and hope for a more egalitarian society.
The torture practices destroyed social networks and seriously
affected people’s ability to trust each other, making the victims feel
isolated, betrayed, and capable of betrayal. As George Orwell
described in his novel 1984, “It imposed fear in the victims and in
society as a whole.” This is the main purpose of torture and the rea-
son dictators use it. 
The Legacy of the Pinochet Regime
Pinochet’s dictatorship was not just the product of a handful
of unscrupulous soldiers, but was supported by a large percentage
of Chileans. When Pinochet was defeated in the 1988 plebiscite,
which led to the restoration of democracy, he obtained 44 percent
of the popular vote. Pinochet’s promise of stability, order, and
progress seduced a large portion of Chilean society that was tired
or afraid of the social unrest that characterized the Allende admin-
istration. Supporters of the dictatorship felt the violence and insta-
bility prevalent in Chile at the time justified the use of torture.
Many accepted the need to take “special measures” in “special cir-
cumstances,” even though such measures lasted for 17 years. At the
time of Pinochet’s death, despite the lack of state honors or public
recognition, thousands of supporters attended his military funeral
to pay their respects. And even after his death, Pinochet continues
to divide Chilean society, serving as a reminder of its painful past.
Yet despite these persistent divisions, Chile has continued to
address its responsibility for the widespread use of torture during
the Pinochet regime since the restoration of democracy in 1990.
Human rights violations have been officially acknowledged by two
presidentially appointed commissions that investigate human
rights abuses and advise on reparation policies for victims. Chilean
courts have prosecuted and condemned to imprisonment several
military and police agents for employing torture against detainees
and murdering or disappearing political opponents. Among those
imprisoned is the director of the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional
(the secret police that functioned from 1974-1977 under
Pinochet’s direct command). Some of those who supported the
regime feebly try to deny knowledge of what happened. Others
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admit that they did not do anything to investigate or oppose
human rights violations, despite the reports published during the
dictatorship by national and international human rights organiza-
tions. 
Chile gained new leadership in efforts to reconcile its past
when President Michelle Bachelet was elected in January 2006. As
a torture survivor whose father, an Air Force General, died in state
custody during the dictatorship, President Bachelet has shown a
strong commitment to addressing the crimes committed during
the dictatorship, listening to the victims, and improving reparation
policies. For instance, only now, 17 years after the restoration of
democracy, is Chile seeking to eliminate the amnesty law passed by
Pinochet and his junta. Bolstered by the insistence of relatives of
victims of human rights crimes and a recent decision of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Bachelet’s Administration is
proposing a law that will either counteract or revoke amnesty.  
The Bush Administration’s Use and 
Justification of Waterboarding
Unfortunately, as in Chile, the use of waterboarding in the
United States has a long history. During the Senate debate on the
Military Commissions’ legislation in 2006, Senator Edward
Kennedy related the case of a Japanese officer who in 1947
received a 15 year sentence of hard labor for waterboarding a U.S.
citizen during World War II. The Washington Post, in an article that
quoted Kennedy, also mentioned that the use of waterboarding
was reportedly investigated by the Army in 1968, after The
Washington Post published a picture of a North Vietnamese soldier
being interrogated under the supervision of a U.S. soldier.8 More
recently, according to a 2005 Human Rights Watch report, the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has authorized several
methods of “harsh” interrogation techniques, including water-
boarding.9
In its 39th session in May 2006, the UN Committee Against
Torture (Committee) examined U.S. compliance with the 1984
CAT. The Committee questioned the Bush administration on
many aspects, including its failure to designate torture as a federal
crime consistent with the definition of the CAT. It also questioned
the Bush administration’s assertion that the CAT is not applicable
in the context of armed conflict, or to certain territories under 
control of the U.S. armed forces, in addition to highlighting the
documented use by U.S. officials of renditions and secret deten-
tion centers.  
The Committee also asserted that acts that define psycholog-
ical torture “are not limited to ‘prolonged and mental harm,’
according to the Bush administration, but are instead a wider cat-
egory of acts which cause severe mental suffering, irrespective of
their prolongation or its duration.”10 In this way, the Committee
was responding to the August 2002 and December 2004 memo-
randa of the Department of Justice that tried to narrow the defini-
tion of torture.
On the specific issue of waterboarding, the Committee regis-
tered its concern “that in 2002 the State party authorized the use
of certain interrogation techniques that have resulted in the death
of some detainees during interrogation. The Committee also
regret[ted] that ‘confusing interrogation rules’ and techniques
defined in vague and general terms, such as ‘stress positions,’ have
led to serious abuses of detainees.” It then recommended that the
U.S. government “rescind any interrogation technique, including
methods involving sexual humiliation, ‘waterboarding,’ ‘short
shackling’ and using dogs to induce fear, that constitutes torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, in all
places of detention under its de facto effective control, in order to
comply with its obligations under the Convention.”11 The
Committee requested that the United States submit its response to
the recommendations within a year.
In response to the Committee, and in Department of Justice
memoranda, the Bush administration attempted to invoke the
extraordinary circumstance of the “War on Terror” to justify the
use of waterboarding. As recently as October 24, 2006, Vice-
President Richard Cheney publicly assented to a journalist’s ques-
tion of whether “a dunk in water is a no-brainer if it can save
lives.”12 Though the White House refused to clarify Cheney’s com-
ment, the public understood it to refer to the use of waterboard-
ing. The administration even attempted to argue that the Geneva
Conventions are obsolete in the “War on Terror.” Those are the
same types of justifications used by dictatorships to try to cover
their crimes under a veil of apparent necessity and legality.
After the embarrassment of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Bush
administration initiated a damage control operation by passing a
law that regulates the Military Commissions. The Military
Commissions Act (MCA), approved by the majority of Congress
“The Water Torture.” Facsimile of a woodcut in J. Damhoudére’s 
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in September 2006, established special commissions to try
detainees from the war on terror held in custody at Guantánamo
Bay.13 The MCA strips the right of habeas corpus from non-U.S.
citizens accused of participating in terrorist activities or founding
terrorist groups, and provides retroactive protection to U.S. agents
who used torture methods. Such protection may also extend 
to government officials who authorized the use of waterboarding
and other torture techniques on prisoners. These laws are reminis-
cent of the amnesty laws passed by the Pinochet dictatorship 
in Chile. 
The Bush administration’s justifications of the use of water-
boarding and other torture techniques have not gone unnoticed by
Americans and the international community. Diligent efforts by
some media outlets, human rights activists, and scholars exposed
the administration’s position and revealed to the public the detri-
mental effect of these policies on human rights. This ongoing dis-
course concerning the legality of the military commissions estab-
lished by the administration to try detainees at Guantánamo Bay
is an important reminder of the boundaries that human rights
principles place on the exercise of power, even in extreme situa-
tions.14
Moving Forward: 
Lessons From the Chilean Experience
Both the Pinochet regime and the Bush administration have
used waterboarding against their enemies. Both have sought to
conceal and justify this fact in similar ways. 
First, both the Pinochet dictatorship and the Bush 
administration exploited the threats of terrorism, violence, and
social unrest to justify the use of torture. Second, both passed laws
granting jurisdiction over “terrorism” to special military courts that
lack the necessary independence to deal impartially with claims of
torture. In Chile, terrorism suspects were judged by military tri-
bunals directly under Pinochet’s chain of command as
Commander-in-Chief of the army. Judges and military prosecutors
paid no attention to detainees’ claims of torture. Military prosecu-
tors were granted the authority to prolong detainees’ isolation for
weeks and months. During this time, detainees were held in cus-
tody by the Central Nacional de Informaciones (National
Information Agency) which, derived from the Home Ministry,
prevented the access of attorneys or independent physicians to the
detainees. Similarly, the MCA established special jurisdiction for
judging “illegal combatants” from the “War on Terror,” which is
external even to regular U.S. military courts. Guantánamo prison-
ers have been subject to severe restrictions on outside contact,
notably, with their lawyers and the Red Cross. Indeed, the Bush
administration “has proposed limiting contact between defence
lawyers and detainees at Guantánamo Bay because it says
detainees’ communications, such as news of world events, could
incite the prisoners to violence.”15
Third, both administrations passed laws restricting detainee
civil rights. The laws passed by the Pinochet regime authorized
that during the investigation of allegedly terrorist crimes, detainees
could be held for long periods in complete isolation and in secret
detention centers operated by the National Information Agency.
Such isolation aided in the torture process, increasing the
detainee’s sense of vulnerability and allowing time for signs of
physical torture to heal. Under a state of siege and other states of
emergency declared by the junta, the exercise of habeas corpus was
limited. When, in an extraordinary act of defiance, the Supreme
Court challenged this decision,16 the junta passed a law that reaf-
firmed its position. A similar policy was used by the Bush admin-
istration, with the endorsement of Congress, to exclude non-U.S.
citizens from habeas corpus protections in the MCA.
Finally, both the Pinochet and Bush governments passed laws
that give protection or amnesty to agents who used torture. Even
though the amnesty law passed by Pinochet’s regime is now being
challenged by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and by
the Chilean government and congress, it posed a serious obstacle
to the investigation and processing of cases of torture and sum-
mary executions for many years after democracy was restored. The
Bush administration’s Military Commissions Act is likely to pose a
similar obstacle because it excludes CIA agents from any legal
charges arising from their use of waterboarding and other methods
of torture. Moreover, it might even protect officials who author-
ized or used torture in the “War on Terror.” Yet a law passed by a
junta of four generals and admirals during a dictatorship is very
different from one passed by a democratically-elected congress in
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the United States, where there is substantial press freedom and a
history of criticism against the use of torture.
The similarities between the Bush administration and the
Pinochet regime in using legal and political instruments to justify
and conceal the use of torture are disturbing. In both cases signifi-
cant efforts were made to attempt to hide the use of torture with a
veil of legality, and to protect agents who tortured. However, it is
important to note that Chile’s eventual acknowledgement of its
massive use of torture, and prosecution of at least some agents, sug-
gests that even the Bush administration’s use of torture will not
exist forever in impunity.
Conclusion
The actions undertaken by the Bush administration to strip
away human rights protections in recent years are strikingly similar
to those executed by the Pinochet dictatorship 30 years ago in
Chile. Both expanded the concept of terrorism, cited “special cir-
cumstances” in authorizing “special methods,” isolated detainees,
created special courts that lacked independence, permitted
impunity and the exemption of criminal responsibility for those
involved in torture, and restricted habeas corpus rights for certain
detainees. Both governments attempted to place a veil of legitimacy
on what international consensus had previously defined as crimes
against humanity. Indeed, recently released secret memoranda of
the Department of Justice are astonishing in their use of legal rea-
soning to justify what is unjustifiable. As in the Pinochet or Nazi
regimes, these memoranda reveal the danger of legal maneuvering
designed to support and legalize the power of the state to commit
crimes.
Chile remains deeply affected by the consequences of human
rights violations committed during the 1973 to 1990 dictatorship.
Thousands of people still seek justice after profound suffering from
the lasting effects of torture, exile, or the disappearance of a rela-
tive. Former military and police agents now prosecuted for human
rights violations feel that they have been abandoned by part of soci-
ety and by their superiors who ordered them to commit such
crimes. Chilean society is still divided about these issues and is
struggling to discover how, if possible, to learn from such a painful
history.  
The Chilean experience does, however, offer hope. If a coun-
try is able to move beyond dictatorship, it can also opt to learn
about, and from, its own horrors. To do so, it must have a strong
conscience — active groups of persistent people who keep these
issues on the agenda — and must be open to external criticism
from international institutions for the protection of human 
rights. The United States has a very strong and active civil society
committed to protecting human rights and a long tradition 
of respecting these rights. Being more open to external 
criticism and learning from the experiences of places like Chile 
can provide an important means of reversing the Bush
Administration’s perilous trend towards diminishing human rights
protections. HRB
